

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

21 April 1977

NOTE FOR:



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FROM:

, DC/HRD

SUBJECT: PRM-11, Task 3

I attach responses to those questions  
designated for the Human Resources Division.



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/F/G.

Attachments:

2 - Question and Comment Papers

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**INFORMATION**  
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QUESTION: (I C-2) How does ICS perform on "Collection and Production?"

b. Development of requirements for and assessment of national intelligence collection and production.

COMMENT: In the absence of a national requirements system for human resources collection, past ICS activity in this area has been limited. The Community recognizes that a need for a requirements system for human resources collection is necessary. A national system is provided for in the recently completed National Foreign Intelligence Plan for Human Resources. This system is now under development and will be supported by the Director of Central Intelligence Human Resources Committee and the Human Resources Division of the Intelligence Community Staff.

The assessment of national human resource collection is accomplished by the Human Resources Committee FOCUS Review Programs. The program has been in existence for two years and places emphasis on the evaluation of reporting from U.S. diplomatic missions around the world. The FOCUS program is being strengthened in a number of ways. The HRD envisages a significant increase in this assessment activity.

The Human Resources Committee and HRD are not directly involved in requirements for and assessment of national intelligence production.

QUESTION: (I C-2) How does ICS perform on "Collection and Production?"

c. Provision of staff support for collection committees of National Foreign Intelligence Board.

COMMENT: The Human Resources Division is actively committed to support of the DCI Human Resources Committee. The Division Chief is the Chairman of the Committee and his Deputy is Vice Chairman. All professionals have important specific responsibilities for the direction and management of the six subcommittees and advisory groups of the HRC. Much of the work of the secretarial personnel of the HRD is in direct support of the committee and its subelements.

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QUESTION: (II A.2.) Where should Clandestine Service function (clandestine collection and covert action) be housed in the bureaucracy?

- a. Department of State
- b. DOD
- c. Separate entity
- d. Remain within CIA

COMMENT: The CS should be a separate entity under the DCI. The CS should not be organizationally "housed" in CIA. It should be directly responsive to the National Security Council through the DCI with maximum flexibility to respond to important national objectives.

The proper role of the CS is to conduct espionage, counter-intelligence and covert action which other departments and agencies are not able to conduct. The CS should be directed toward the high priority strategic intelligence objectives. The CS has largely become a current intelligence collector and reporter (political, economic, narcotics, etc.) on a broad range of target areas of secondary priority. The result has been impaired CS strategic effectiveness, erosion of cover, and compromising exposures. Such erosion and exposure occur primarily through non-communist and third world "host country" operations (collection and covert action) of secondary priority. The CS is conducting collection activity which in many cases could be carried out overtly by the Foreign Service or others;

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in other cases the target priority does not warrant clandestine collection.

The proposed separation of the CS from CIA would include giving the CS its own administration and support capability. This would help eliminate the debilitating personnel cover and security erosion that occurs through the regular transfer of support personnel into and out of the CS from the overt components of CIA. Separation of the espionage function from CIA as an organization might in turn make cooperation between overt collectors and the national analytical and production offices more palatable and effective.

The CS collection and covert action missions would be redefined to concentrate the bulk of the effort against hard, strategic targets such as the USSR, China, and Cuba, and only selected high priority non-communist country targets, including programs for strategic wartime or crisis contingency operations.

While concentrating the CS on the more limited but vital targets, CIA (Directorate of Intelligence) would strengthen its collection guidance and support apparatus to improve the information-gathering activities of the Foreign Service and related overt collection and reporting assets of the government. This support might include detailing personnel to the Foreign Service to aid in stimulation and management of overt collection and reporting activities at overseas missions.

This proposal would enable the CS to rehabilitate itself as a true clandestine service, which it no longer is, and place the main responsibility for overt and semi-overt collection of foreign information where it belongs, with strong support from and closer linkage to the national analytical and production elements in CIA.

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